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Abstract 
Outcome-adaptive randomization (OAR) has been proposed as a corrective to certain ethical 
difficulties inherent in the traditional randomized clinical trial (RCT) using fixed-ratio randomization. 
In particular, it has been suggested that OAR redresses the balance between individual and collective 
ethics in favour of the former. In this paper I examine issues of welfare and autonomy arising in 
relation to OAR. A central issue in discussions of welfare in OAR is equipoise, and the moral status 
of OAR is crucially influenced by the way in which this concept is construed. If OAR is based on a 
model of equipoise that demands strict indifference throughout the trial between competing 
interventions, such equipoise is disturbed by accruing data favouring one treatment over another; 
OAR seeks to redress this by weighting randomization to the seemingly superior treatment. However, 
this is a partial response, as patients continue to be allocated to the inferior therapy. Moreover, it rests 
upon considerations of aggregate harms and benefits, and does not therefore uphold individual ethics. 
Issues of fairness also arise, as early and late enrollees are randomized on a different basis. Fixed-ratio 
randomization represents a fuller and more consistent response to a loss of equipoise, as so construed. 
With regard to consent, the complexity of OAR poses challenges to adequate disclosure and 
comprehension. Additionally, OAR does not offer a remedy to the therapeutic misconception – 
participants’ tendency to attribute treatment allocation in an RCT to individual clinical judgments, 
rather than scientific consideration – and, if anything, accentuates rather than alleviates the 
misconception. In relation to these issues, OAR fails to offer ethical advantages over fixed-ratio 
randomization. More broadly, the ethical basis of OAR can be seen to lie more in collective than in 
individual ethics, and overall it fares worse in this territory than fixed-ratio randomization. 
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Introduction 
Recent advances in randomized clinical trials (RCTs) include the use of adaptive designs. Such 
studies incorporate changes to trial design as the study proceeds, including changes to randomization 
[1]. Covariate-adaptive randomization, for example, modifies allocation to achieve optimum balance 
between groups on baseline characteristics. Outcome-adaptive randomization (OAR) also adjusts the 
allocation of participants, but in this instance on the basis of accruing outcome data (provided that 
such data are available in a suitably timely manner), such that participants are allocated with greater 
probability to the treatment that hitherto appears to be superior. In a traditional RCT, however, there is 
fixed-ratio (usually 1:1) randomization (FRR). This allocation persists throughout the duration of the 
trial, unless a planned interim analysis leads its early termination, or to an arm being dropped prior to 
the end of the study. Allocation of participants is therefore independent of any accruing data, in 
contrast to the dynamic method of randomization used within OAR. 
 
There is a broad literature on the methodological and statistical aspects of OAR. More recently, a 
number of articles have addressed some of its ethical implications [2–13]. This paper seeks to 
contribute to this discussion, in the context of a simple two-arm RCT,1 and with a particular focus on 
two central ethical issues: welfare and autonomy. I will argue that OAR faces challenges in relation to 
each of these issues. 
 
Protecting participant welfare 
A method that minimizes the allocation of participants to a putatively inferior treatment appears to be 
ethically advantageous. In particular, it has been suggested [7, 18–21] that OAR has the merit of 
favouring the notion of individual, as opposed to collective, ethics – a distinction developed in the 
specific context of clinical trials by Lellouch and Schwartz:  
an experimental design or strategy is based on collective ethics if it conduces to maximizing the 
total benefit of the group, and conversely it is founded on individual ethics if it conduces to 
maximizing benefit for each participant, taken individually, at the point at which treatment is 
intended [22, p.128]. 
Broadly, therefore, collective ethics justifies actions in terms of their aggregate benefit or reduction of 
harm. Clinical research can thereby be morally justified on the basis of the benefits that are expected 
to flow to future patients or to the population at large. On this way of thinking, such benefits, owing to 
                                                            
1 I follow Hey and Kimmelman’s [2] landmark paper in focusing on the two-arm case. It has been argued by 
some [14–17] that in terms of certain methodological and statistical characteristics OAR has more to offer in 
multi-arm trials than in two-arm trials – though merits are nonetheless claimed for the two-arm case [14]. 
However, most of the ethical issues to be discussed apply to both the two-arm and the multi-arm context; 
instances in which different considerations may apply will be noted. 
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their larger scale, may justifiably outweigh any harm or loss of benefit that may arise in respect of the 
smaller number of individual participants within the study, provided that such harm or loss of benefit 
is minimized. Individual ethics, on the other hand, places the emphasis on the welfare of the 
individual. In particular, it resists the interests of the individual being subjugated to those of a broader 
collectivity. The moral reasoning underlying collective ethics is fundamentally consequentialist, 
whereby the criterion of right action is ultimately the aggregate balance of harms and benefits. In 
contrast, the reasoning underlying individual ethics is closer to deontology, in which the criterion of 
right action is centred on appraising benefits and harms in relation to specific individuals. Deontology 
insists that moral decision-making should take account of the ‘distinction between persons’ [23, 
p.134] and should not analyse harms and benefits solely at an aggregate level. The distinction between 
collective and individual ethics is often mapped onto that between the roles of researcher and 
clinician, respectively [24–27].  
 
Importantly, Lellouch and Schwartz [22], and others [24, 27–29], interpret individual ethics literally, 
in terms of the individual patient. A different interpretation is to contrast individual and collective 
ethics in terms of ‘doing what it best for current subjects in the trial versus doing what is best for 
future patients’ [21, p.174]. This suggests not so much a contrast between the individual and the 
collectivity, but one between two collectivities – one (smaller) consisting of the patients in the trial 
and another (larger) consisting of future patients who stand to benefit from the result of the trial. 
However, the more plausible construal of individual ethics – to be adopted here – is in terms of the 
welfare of each person, taken singly. 
 
Equipoise 
A principle in the ethics of RCTs that is advanced in support of individual ethics is equipoise. There 
are somewhat different interpretations of the principle [30], but they have in common the notion that 
random allocation to the interventions tested within an RCT is ethically justified if there is uncertainty 
as to their relative effectiveness. As originally formulated by Fried [31], what has come to be known 
as ‘theoretical’ (or ‘individual’) equipoise requires that the individual investigator be indifferent as to 
the relative effectiveness of the interventions. Subsequently, Freedman [32] developed a form of 
‘clinical’ (or ‘community’) equipoise that locates this uncertainty at the level of the clinical 
community, such that what matters ethically is that there is indifference among clinicians in general as 
to the optimum treatment, regardless of whether individual practitioners have treatment preferences. 
Crucially, if the demands of equipoise (on either definition) are satisfied, patients are not knowingly 
disadvantaged by being randomized to one arm of the trial rather than another. Fillion [13] points out 
that an additional requirement of a trial is that it should be capable of disturbing – or at least 
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contributing to disturbing – the state of equipoise that existed at the outset; so equipoise must exist, 
but it must also be assailable. 
 
Two models of equipoise in outcome-adaptive randomization 
Equipoise in specific relation to OAR has been discussed by several authors [2, 9–13]. However, an 
analysis of the ethics of OAR depends crucially on how equipoise is conceived. The distinction 
previously outlined between theoretical and clinical equipoise was based on where equipoise is judged 
– at the level of the individual investigator or at that of the clinical community. A more pressing 
concern for the ethics of OAR, however, is how emerging evidence is acted upon in relation to 
equipoise. A somewhat different distinction is therefore required between two models of equipoise. 
On one reading, which I will refer to as E1, data emerging from the trial that appear to favour one 
intervention over another serve immediately to disturb the state of equipoise and thereby create a 
corresponding immediate moral imperative to increase the probability that participants will be 
allocated to the better-performing intervention. Thus, Saxman notes: 
Outcome-adaptive randomized trials start out in equipoise, but equipoise is disturbed as soon as 
data are available from the first group of patients enrolled into the study and the randomization 
is adapted to favor the ‘better’ treatment arm [9, p.63]. 
 
The second reading of equipoise, which I will label E2, is offered by London [11] and Bothwell and 
Kesselheim [12] and advances a different relationship between emerging data and the adjustment of 
randomization weights from that proposed within E1. London argues that OAR is compatible with 
clinical equipoise because the latter does not require that randomization probabilities should be equal: 
If it is consistent with concerns for welfare for a patient to be directly treated with A or B or C 
(to receive that intervention with certainty), then it cannot violate concern for welfare if that 
patient is assigned to those interventions with any distribution of probabilities that sums to 1 
[11, p.412]. 
 
This is persuasive. If k is the number of treatments under test, it does not matter ethically that some 
participants are randomized to treatment A with a probability less than 1/k, because treatment A is 
regarded as optimum by a portion of the expert community (even if the other treatments under test are 
preferred by a larger portion of the community). It is common for trials using FRR to employ 
unbalanced randomization [33] in order to gather fuller information on one treatment than another, or 
because access to one treatment is more limited than to the other(s), or because doing so secures 
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greater statistical power in certain multi-arm trials.2 In terms of London’s argument, this practice is 
acceptable.  
 
However, when we come to consider OAR, the issue is not simply the presence of unequal 
randomization weights, but their adjustment – and specifically, their adjustment on the grounds of 
participant welfare. London maintains that OAR is consistent with clinical equipoise because: 
even if rational inquirers recognise that initial evidence from a clinical trial supports the clinical 
merits of one intervention (A) over the others (B or C), that evidence may not be strong enough 
to lead responsible experts to alter their recommendations, or to alter the recommendation of 
every expert in that community [11, p.413].  
 
Interventions B and C therefore remain admissible treatments within the trial notwithstanding such 
initial evidence – their appropriateness is not questioned as it would be under E1. Whilst this 
argument reconciles unbalanced randomization with clinical equipoise, it is not immediately obvious 
how it provides a moral rationale for OAR. If an existing imbalance is compatible with clinical 
equipoise, what is the motivation for adjusting it in the light of accruing evidence? London’s [11, 
p.412] explanation is that OAR: 
should be seen as modelling an idealised health system within which diverse communities of 
fully informed experts who disagree about the relative merits of a set of interventions shrink or 
grow as their constituent members update their expert opinions in light of reliable medical 
evidence.  
 
Accordingly, randomization weights are an: 
idealised representation of the probability that a patient in such an idealised learning health 
system would encounter a practitioner from these communities if they were to be allocated to a 
clinician at random. 
 
Within E1, participant welfare depends upon the investigator responding continuously to accruing 
data, such that data favouring one intervention over another are evidence of its superiority and 
therefore disturb equipoise, requiring an adjustment to randomization probabilities at this juncture. In 
contrast, E2 does not regard such data as evidence of overall treatment superiority or inferiority, and 
maintains that the initial state of clinical equipoise can survive such evidence until such a point that 
                                                            
2 These are specific circumstances; as a general rule unbalanced randomization leads to reduced statistical 
power.  
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differences in outcome ‘are sufficiently convincing to reasonably inform the medical community and 
clinical practice’ [12, p.28]. No immediate change to randomization probabilities is therefore 
required. Thus, within E2, participant welfare is promoted differently, by adjusting the probability of 
randomization to a particular intervention in proportion to the size of the clinical community 
favouring that intervention, such that ‘patients in an [OAR] study have a better chance of being 
treated with what is ultimately recognised as the best treatment for their condition’ [11, p.413]. On 
this account, and in contrast to E1, changing randomization probabilities are not a direct response to 
emerging evidence of treatment effect. Instead, these data are taken as predictive of clinicians’ 
behaviour in response to such evidence, and it is this anticipated change (or lack of change) in 
behaviour that is reflected back to motivate the adjustment of randomization probabilities.  
 
Equipoise is clearly a more acute problem in the context of OAR under E1 than under E2; indeed, E2 
obviates many of the equipoise-related concerns that arise within OAR. I will not seek here to 
arbitrate between these two models of equipoise, in terms of their relative strengths and weaknesses, 
or otherwise privilege one account over the other, and nor will I assess moral or epistemological 
challenges that have been made to the overall concept of equipoise [34–38]. Instead, I will focus the 
subsequent discussion in this section on the situation where, as commonly occurs, advocates of OAR 
base their standpoint on an interpretation of equipoise that aligns with E1, and will explore the 
challenges that such an account faces when viewed on its own terms.3 
 
Responding to (loss of) equipoise under E1 
It is clear that equipoise is handled differently in FRR and OAR. In both cases, the trial begins in a 
state of equipoise. In FRR, except for any planned interim analyses, assessments of relative treatment 
effectiveness are not made, and equipoise is therefore not reassessed, until completion of the trial. In 
OAR, however, treatment effectiveness is continuously reassessed, and equipoise is therefore 
similarly re-evaluated, and according to E1 if equipoise is found to be disturbed, allocation is adjusted 
in favour of the hitherto superior treatment. The consequence, however, is that participants are still 
randomized to the apparently inferior treatment, albeit at a lower rate. This compensates for a loss of 
equipoise, but it does not restore it, because, for Saxman [9], the trialist is knowingly randomizing 
some participants to a treatment believed to be inferior.4  
                                                            
3 In addition, whilst E2 provides a clear account of idealized changes in the size of the clinical community 
favouring an intervention in response to emerging evidence, and of how this might provide a motivation to alter 
randomization weights, it is less clear how, in practical terms, this is translated into a specific decision at the 
level of the trial to adjust these weights. A more developed account of how this might occur is needed for a full 
evaluation of E2 in the context of OAR. 
4 It should be noted that E2, as expounded by London [11], rejects such a notion of ‘belief’, on the basis that it 
suggests an epistemologically implausible model of a single ‘meta-agent’ whose beliefs regarding emerging data 
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Judged in terms of E1, this is, on the face of it, ethically problematic. The advocate of OAR might 
respond that because allocation is weighted towards the treatment judged to be superior, most patients 
will now receive that treatment. There are three points to note here. First, such an argument retreats 
from individual ethics, as it rests upon a notion of aggregate benefit – the fact that most participants 
will receive the superior treatment is taken to justify the continued allocation of a smaller number to 
the inferior treatment.5 This constitutes a consequentialist justification, reflecting the notion of 
collective ethics, and any attempt to appeal to individual ethics in support of OAR therefore founders. 
Second, it rests on a questionable moral logic, whereby the action taken only partially fulfils the moral 
consideration that prompted it. Thus, Royall proposes a more consistent response, arguing that ‘after 
finding enough evidence favouring A to require reducing the probability of B, the physician obeying 
the personal care principle must see that the next patient gets A, not just with high probability, but 
with certainty’ [40, p.58]. 
 
Third, it depends upon what is meant by ‘most’ participants. The weighting of randomization in OAR 
appears to ensure that the proportion of participants allocated to the inferior treatment in OAR is 
henceforth smaller than in FRR. However, as a trial based on OAR is likely to require more 
participants, at given levels of statistical significance and power, than one based on FRR, the number 
of participants allocated to the seemingly inferior treatment may be greater than under FRR [5, 
41,42].6 Hence, it is true that, within a trial, OAR will normally minimize the proportion, and thus the 
number, of participants randomized to the inferior treatment. However, if we are considering a 
comparison between a trial based on OAR and one based on FRR – our current concern – whilst the 
proportions will still favour OAR, the numbers may not. Of course, under OAR there may also be a 
larger number allocated to the superior treatment than under FRR. This, however, would only count in 
favour of OAR is one were to accept a consequentialist moral calculus that permits a direct trade-off 
between benefits and harms – one that is out of keeping with the deontological basis of individual 
ethics, which would place some degree of prohibition on harm even in the face of a greater 
countervailing benefit. Moreover, setting aside the distribution of participants across the arms of the 
                                                            
are required to be reconciled. Instead, evidence emerging from the trial is taken by London to represent a 
distribution of beliefs within an idealized medical community.  
5 Thus, Tehranisa and Meurer argue that OAR ‘works to collectively favour the patients within the trial in 
situations when one treatment is ultimately better than the other’ [39, p.2131, emphasis added]. 
6 The proviso ‘may be greater’ is stated because, depending on both the size of the study and the proportion of 
participants assigned to the ultimately inferior treatment, there may be certain instances where the number 
receiving the inferior treatment under OAR is smaller than would be expected with 1:1 FRR, though the 
difference is likely to be modest [43]. Similarly, the total number of patients required in an OAR study may in 
certain circumstances be smaller than in an FFR trial [42].  
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trial, any increase in the sample size, and the associated costs of a study, raises morally relevant issues 
of efficiency [2, 13, 44].7 
 
If we consider participants across the duration of the trial, an additional difficulty emerges in respect 
of participants enrolled either early or late. Turning first to those enrolled early, Korn and Freidlin 
[41] point out that at the outset of a trial using OAR there is little information on which to base the 
weighting of randomization. The intention to randomize preferentially to the superior treatment is 
therefore realized minimally, if at all, at this juncture. Hence, on epistemic grounds, the proposed 
ethical merit of OAR cannot be claimed in respect of those enrolled early.  
 
Conversely, with respect to those enrolled later in the trial, as the study proceeds and data on 
outcomes accrue, the informational basis for OAR augments, and whilst most participants are 
randomized to the favoured treatment, others continue to be randomized to a treatment increasingly 
disfavoured by the data. Hence, some individuals enrolled late in the trial receive a treatment strongly 
disfavoured by the accumulating data, and one that does not uphold participant welfare under E1. 
Accordingly, any moral justification for allocating participants to the apparently inferior treatment 
becomes increasingly tenuous as the trial proceeds. So, in different but equally problematic ways, 
ethical difficulties occur with OAR in respect of both early and late enrollees – for the former, no 
benefit seems to accrue through OAR in terms of welfare, and for some of the latter, a loss of such 
benefit is countenanced. 
 
For Saxman [9], the fact that early and late participants have differing probabilities of receiving the 
ostensibly superior intervention is problematic with regard to justice as it applies to the fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Relevant here is a consideration of procedural justice, which 
specifically concerns the processes and methods whereby benefits or burdens are allocated. Here we 
can note that, throughout the course of the study, OAR allocates all participants (except for the very 
first) with greater likelihood to the apparently superior treatment, according to the current state of 
knowledge at the time of enrolment. In terms of what Rawls [45] calls pure procedural justice – 
whereby, once the procedure of allocation is deemed just, there is no separate criterion for judging the 
outcome of such an allocation – there would seem to be no difficulty with OAR, as every participant 
is treated similarly, conditional upon current knowledge. However, other readings of procedural 
justice – those that Rawls [45] calls perfect and imperfect procedural justice – require an independent 
assessment of the substantive outcome of the process of allocating benefits and burdens.8 On this 
                                                            
7 There is, however, evidence that under certain conditions multi-arm trials employing OAR may be more 
efficient than two-arm OAR trials, and sometimes more efficient than a multi-arm trial with FFR [15, 16]. 
8 Within perfect procedural justice, a process of allocation can be defined that will guarantee a just substantive 
outcome (where such an outcome is defined in terms other than the allocation process per se). Within imperfect 
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basis, it is hard not to be uneasy at the differing prospects of benefit for early versus late enrolment, 
within OAR among participants who are ‘otherwise equal’ [9, p.64]. The procedure of allocation 
alone does not seem to provide sufficient reassurance and independent justification of its outcome is 
needed.  
 
One way to lessen this concern would be to appeal to the notion of choice. Provided that they are told 
how allocation probabilities may change, participants can make their own decision on the probability 
that they find acceptable and time their enrolment accordingly. However, such choice is not available 
to all. Necessarily, not all participants can choose to delay enrolment in order to secure favourable 
probabilities, as this is only possible if some have already enrolled first. Additionally, it has been 
pointed out that, in many trials, those who are sicker or have a poorer prognosis cannot afford to delay 
enrolment [2], so not all can choose to join a study at a potentially advantageous time. Finally, 
concerns related to comprehension – to be addressed later – suggest that only those participants who 
had fully understood the implications of changes in allocation probabilities would be able to exercise 
such choice effectively [10].9 Saxman [9] refers to psychological research [46] to suggest that there is 
a stronger appeal to fairness when individuals know that their outcomes differ from those of others 
than when they do not. This may explain perceptions of (un)fairness, but more is required to settle the 
issue of whether a specific distribution is intrinsically fair. Appeals to choice, or to individuals’ 
perceptions, seem to translate the issue into one of autonomy, and the differing levels of benefit and 
burden over the course of the trial remain in need of justification in terms of justice. 
 
In Palmer’s view, the fact that late enrollees may do better than early enrollees is ‘what medical 
progress is all about anyway – treating tomorrow’s patients better than today’s’ [47, p.395]. The 
appeal to clinical practice does not, however, appear apposite here. Advances in medical treatment are 
a welcome consequence of research, but the time at which patients present for such treatment is a 
natural process, and hence the way in which the benefits of medical advances are distributed to 
patients over time is not a matter of human decision. In a trial, however, any differential distribution 
of therapeutic benefit arising from the design and conduct of the study is the responsibility of the 
investigator and requires a specific moral justification. Palmer also argues that early enrollees may be 
comforted by the knowledge that patients in trials tend to fare better than those outside trials [47]. 
This too does not seem to address the issue – we are concerned here with the fair treatment of 
                                                            
procedural justice, a just substantive outcome is not guaranteed, as ‘there is no feasible procedure which is sure 
to lead to it’ [45 p.86]. 
9 If such choice as to the timing of enrolment were in fact feasible, it would raise issues for the internal validity 
of the study, as the changing randomization ratios would tend to be associated with changes in the 
characteristics of the participants being allocated [9, 10].  
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individuals within a trial, not with how they are treated in comparison to others outside the context of 
medical research. 
 
Let us switch our focus to the end of the trial. Piantadosi states that a motivation for adaptive methods 
is ‘a desire to minimize the number of subjects entered on what will be shown to be the inferior 
treatment’ [48, p.340, emphasis added]. This points to a proleptic assumption as to the outcome of the 
study that may be unwarranted. As Buyse [4] has indicated, the definitive conclusion reached on the 
treatments being tested may be at odds with the allocation that has occurred through OAR during the 
trial (owing to the imprecision with which the adaptive allocation probabilities are estimated from the 
data). Thus, it may sometimes occur that throughout the trial the weighting of randomization is in the 
direction of the inferior treatment, with the result that most participants will have received this 
ultimately disfavoured intervention [49, 50]. The moral objective of OAR is thereby wholly 
frustrated.  
 
Even if OAR does weight allocation probabilities in line with the overall verdict of the study, it is 
important to demonstrate that it has done so on the basis of sufficient and relevant evidence. 
Adjustment to randomization has to be made on the basis of data that are available in a timely manner, 
which will normally mean a short-term outcome. If longer-term outcomes are more relevant, but are 
not available to form the basis of such adjustment, the informational basis for changing randomization 
probabilities may be incomplete (because other important information is unavailable) or unsound 
(because using only short-term information may not reflect a more global judgment that would be 
reached across all outcomes).10  
 
A final ethical difficulty facing OAR is that of demonstrating why an accumulation of evidence that, 
within E1, is considered sufficient to disturb equipoise and thus to justify weighting randomization 
against one intervention, on the grounds of its perceived inferiority, is not also a reason to stop the 
trial altogether, as would likely occur during a planned interim analysis in a trial using FRR. As noted 
earlier, the trialist employing OAR seemingly makes only a partial response to information that 
suggests that some participants will be disadvantaged by allocation to a particular treatment. In 
contrast, terminating the trial seems to address such a loss of equipoise head-on. Advocates of OAR 
need to provide a clear, non-arbitrary criterion to distinguish the level of information that requires 
                                                            
10 Hey and Kimmelman [2] discuss this issue with specific reference to phase 2 and phase 3 clinical trials; see 
also Lee [7]. The possibility that the criterion for adaptive randomization might be based on more than one 
outcome variable presents a challenge. In covariate-adaptive randomization, baseline covariates can be 
differentially weighted in terms of their potential confounding influences – which might be determined 
empirically – and the randomization algorithm can be determined accordingly. In OAR, however, such 
outcomes would have to be weighted in terms of their relationship to a particular conceptualization of 
participant welfare. Determining the appropriate weightings in such terms would not be straightforward. 
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some participants to be diverted from the inferior treatment from the level of information that requires 
all participants to be so diverted by halting the trial.  
 
This problem does not just relate to participants at the point of randomization. A similar argument 
could be made regarding certain participants already in the trial. If accruing information is sufficient 
to weight subsequent allocation towards the apparently superior treatment, for reasons of consistency 
should not participants already on the inferior treatment be moved across to the better treatment (if to 
do so is clinically feasible)? Clearly, this would undermine the scientific rigour of the trial, effectively 
reducing it to a cohort study, and if it is not done this indicates that participants are maintained on the 
apparently inferior treatment for the sake of science, rather than to uphold individual ethics. 
 
A reading of equipoise based on E1 seems to create important challenges for OAR. Having 
determined that trial data showing differential treatment effectiveness disturb equipoise, there is no 
clear means by which equipoise can either be restored or its loss appropriately compensated for. Many 
of these challenges do not arise under E2, owing to its ability to maintain equipoise in the face of data 
that appear to favour one treatment over another. How we regard participant welfare in RCTs based 
on OAR therefore depends significantly on how we construe equipoise. 
 
Protecting participant autonomy 
Like equipoise, consent is commonly regarded as an ethical prerequisite for RCTs, as a means of 
upholding participants’ autonomy. However, the moral force of consent depends on its being 
adequately informed, as lack of information prevents meaningful choice and is thus a constraint on 
autonomy [51]. More specifically, in order to support autonomous choice, consent requires an 
appropriate equilibrium between disclosure and understanding. What potential participants are told 
should be sufficient to provide them with a sound factual basis for their decision, but should not be so 
detailed as to create confusion or information overload.  
 
There is, however, considerable empirical evidence that the understanding and recall required for 
consent to be informed are very hard to achieve [52, 53]. This is likely to be particularly challenging 
when seeking to explain a method of allocation that adapts itself dynamically during the course of the 
trial. Also, as Saxman indicates [9], participants need to understand that although accumulating data 
can cause randomization probabilities to change, they may still be allocated to the currently 
disfavoured treatment. Equally difficult may be to explain that the information on treatment response 
that causes changes to the allocation process at a particular time is only provisional, based on 
emerging trends, and that the definitive conclusion at the end of the trial may be different. 
Additionally, participants should understand that, owing to the small amount of data available, for the 
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first few individuals enrolled in the study there is little on which to base the adaptive allocation to 
treatment arms, whereas this is less so for later participants.11 It is likely, therefore, that the necessary 
balance between disclosure and understanding is hard to achieve – the complexity of the information 
required to permit an informed choice is likely to exceed many participants’ comprehension. 
Furthermore, this complexity may increase the likelihood of framing effects: a cognitive bias whereby 
subtly different ways of presenting equivalent information may result in different choices [54]. These 
effects may weaken the validity of consent [55]. If, as a result of the potential difficulties outlined 
above,12 understanding on the part of the participant is inadequately achieved, consent loses much of 
its moral authority. 
 
Furthermore, because allocation is based on a continuous re-appraisal of outcome data, information 
given to participants at the point of recruitment should be constantly adjusted to reflect this most 
recent appraisal. Equally, updated information should be provided to those already in the trial, as the 
information on which they based their original consent may now be outdated. Accordingly, not only 
will the details given to the first few individuals to enrol differ considerably from those that should be 
given to individuals enrolling at a much later point in the study, but the latter information should also 
be provided to the early enrollees already in the trial so that their continuing consent can be 
confirmed.  
 
These difficulties related to consent do not directly undermine the appropriateness of OAR as a 
research design, but given that adequate understanding is a prerequisite for consent, and that in turn 
consent is, prima facie, a necessary condition for a trial being morally justified, they are challenges 
that must be addressed.13 
 
The therapeutic misconception 
An issue with important implications for consent is the therapeutic misconception [56]. This describes 
the tendency for participants to misinterpret clinical research in terms of clinical practice – despite 
receiving detailed information clarifying the scientific nature of the study – and thereby assume that 
                                                            
11 As is clear from earlier discussion, the role that such information plays will differ according to whether E1 or 
E2 is adopted as the underlying criterion of adaptive randomization. In either case, however, the requirement to 
tell participants that – and how – such information is to be used is essentially the same. 
12 There is little empirical evidence in the specific context of OAR, but these seem reasonable assumptions 
given what we do know about information and recall in relation to consent. One experimental study that has 
examined comprehension of OAR found that, whilst self-rated understanding of OAR versus FRR did not differ, 
correct identification of the method of treatment allocation was significantly lower in those presented with a 
description of OAR than in those presented with a description of FRR [39]. It is also reasonable to think that 
challenges in terms of disclosure and comprehension are greater in a multi-arm than in a two-arm OAR trial. 
13 Joffe and Ellenberg [5] and Bothwell and Kesselheim [12] consider some practical issues relating to the 
gaining of consent in OAR. 
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the treatment they receive in a trial will reflect their individual clinical needs, rather than the scientific 
goal of the study. In particular, the fact that treatment is determined by randomization, rather than 
clinical indication, may be misunderstood, and such misunderstanding undermines the adequacy of 
consent [57, 58]. Closely allied to this is the notion of therapeutic misestimation: a tendency to 
overestimate the benefits, or underestimate the harms, associated with trial participation [59]. 
 
Meurer et al suggest that the use of OAR may offset the therapeutic misconception by ‘clos[ing] the 
gap between what trial participants believe and what they experience’ [60, p.2377]. In support of this 
claim, they point to the increasing probability that participants who join the trial later will receive the 
treatment ultimately found to be superior. However, as the therapeutic misconception centres on the 
issue of individualized care, in order for the design of a trial to mitigate this misconception, one would 
need to demonstrate that such a design adapts allocation to the individual participant’s clinical needs. 
This is not the case with OAR, which only seeks to adjust allocation in terms of aggregate treatment 
effectiveness. It remains a stochastic method of allocation, in which randomization probabilities are 
normally adjusted in relation to sequences of patients [61], rather than from one patient to the next, 
and does not therefore align the allocation of trial interventions with the characteristics of particular 
individuals. 
 
If anything, OAR is liable to reinforce, rather than alleviate, the therapeutic misconception, in two 
ways. First, an explanation of the way in which allocation is adjusted is likely to further reduce 
potential participants’ understanding that such allocation is still a random process, albeit weighted. 
Secondly, by indicating that treatment allocation will be influenced by evidence of differential clinical 
benefit, OAR may encourage participants to believe that treatment within the trial will be tailored to 
the individual; they may mistake a change in allocation intended to favour participants in general for 
one directed at their specific clinical needs. Moreover, Hey and Kimmelman [2] point out that the 
problem is likely to be most acute among participants allocated to the seemingly inferior arm of the 
study, as their allocation is most at variance with what they would expect under the therapeutic 
misconception. Furthermore, aside from its effect on the therapeutic misconception, OAR may 
encourage therapeutic misestimation. Having understood the notion that changing randomization 
ratios will track emerging provisional evidence of therapeutic benefit, participants may attach undue 
weight to this fact – overlooking the provisional nature of such evidence and assuming that being 
randomized to the apparently superior treatment is a strong, or even conclusive, indication of the best 
intervention. So, whilst those randomized to the worse-performing arm may be particularly 
susceptible to the therapeutic misconception, those randomized in the other direction may be 
particularly susceptible to therapeutic misestimation. 
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As noted earlier, in some circumstances, more participants in total may be allocated to the inferior 
treatment than to the superior treatment, given the conclusion reached at the conclusion of the study. 
Even if this situation does not arise across the trial as a whole, it may occur at a certain time. For 
example, at one or more points in the trial, OAR may have favoured the treatment ultimately shown to 
be inferior, even though across the whole trial randomization was weighted towards the superior 
treatment. Certain participants will thereby have been randomized on what turns out to be unreliable 
information. The moral objection here is not that these patients should not have been allocated in this 
way at the time, as it is only with hindsight that this can be judged, but that the situation is likely to 
run counter to participants’ expectations, creating an additional form of misconception. Whilst 
participants may understand that OAR will randomize preferentially in relation to the emerging 
evidence on treatment benefit, it is far less likely that they will fully appreciate that such allocation 
may turn out to have been in the ‘wrong’ direction. They are likely to have consented assuming that 
randomization will be weighted throughout towards the better treatment.  
 
Scientific validity of the trial 
Although the primary importance of consent is clearly ethical, in relation to considerations of 
autonomy, the information provided as the basis for consent, and the nature of the consent process, 
may also have implications for the validity of the trial. These methodological considerations will in 
turn have ethical implications, on the basis that scientific rigour is a necessary (though not a 
sufficient) condition for a study to be ethically justified [62]. If consent requires participants to be 
informed of the weighting of randomization at the time of enrolment, those who subsequently 
discover that they are in the disfavoured treatment arm may be more likely than other participants to 
drop out of the study [5], thereby undermining the statistical comparability of the treatment groups. 
Equally, if, as argued earlier, those enrolling early should be informed of later changes in the 
weighting of randomization, this may lead to resentful demoralization or compensatory rivalry 
amongst those who find themselves in the disfavoured treatment arm, and a consequent biasing of 
outcomes.14 Further, a need to update participants on changes in allocation probabilities may 
undermine blinding, in trials where this is important [10]. Such lack of blinding would lead to bias, 
either in participants’ responses to treatment, or in individual investigators’ recruitment behaviour or 
assessment of outcome [64]. 
 
                                                            
14 Resentful demoralization describes a phenomenon whereby those perceiving themselves to be receiving the 
less desirable intervention may become disheartened and respond less well. In contrast, compensatory rivalry 
occurs where such individuals respond better in an attempt to offset the perceived disadvantage of receiving the 
less favourable intervention [63]. An additional possibility is switching – those aware that they are receiving the 
less desirable intervention may try to obtain the better alternative. 
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Conclusions 
Several ethical issues arise within OAR to do with both welfare and autonomy, and these are mostly 
related to the way in which OAR responds to changing information during the trial (Figure). Of 
course, if the null hypothesis is ultimately retained, there is no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ treatment, and it 
may seem not to matter to which arm participants were allocated during the trial [6]. However, whilst 
such an outcome may obviate the problem of ‘inappropriately’ weighted randomization, it thereby 
also removes the intended benefit of OAR.  
 
At the root of welfare-related issues in OAR is the notion of equipoise. If the advocate of OAR adopts 
the first model of equipoise that I have described, E1, these issues are acute, as he or she is committed 
to regarding an intervention disfavoured by emerging data as being inferior and therefore as a threat to 
participant welfare. For an advocate of OAR who subscribes to E2, however, a disfavoured 
intervention retains legitimacy provided it is still recommended by some portion of the expert clinical 
community. 
 
It would appear that OAR does not uphold – and cannot therefore appeal to – the notion of individual 
ethics, as allocation does not respond to the individual characteristics or needs of each participant. 
Instead, OAR seems to rely more on collective than on individual ethics, by focusing on the idea that, 
in aggregate, more patients will be allocated to the better treatment. Thus, when Pullman and Wang 
argue that OAR seeks to ‘treat as many patients as successfully or effectively as possible’ [18, p.204], 
they retreat from individual to collective ethics. Unfortunately, OAR may not fare well once viewed 
in terms of collective ethics, as although the proportion of patients allocated to the better treatment is 
greater than under FRR, the number of such patients may not be – and when choosing between these 
two designs it is surely the number, not the proportion, that should feature in the consequentialist 
balancing of benefit and harm that lies at the heart of collective ethics. Thus, the claim that OAR 
protects individual ethics in the context of an RCT appears to be unfounded. Instead, much of the 
ethical rationale for OAR is centred in collective ethics, and having entered that territory it appears to 
fare worse than FRR. In fact, it can be argued more generally that the pursuit of individual over 
collective ethics is misplaced in clinical trials. The purpose of such studies is to generate valid 
conclusions as to aggregate treatment effectiveness and this requires individual clinical decision 
making to be at least partly subordinated to the demands of the research design – as the therapeutic 
misconception indicates. In the final analysis, clinical trials are concerned with reaching a decision 
about patients as collectivities rather than as individuals. Consequently, with some exceptions (e.g. 
monitoring for adverse events in individual participants, or ensuring that consent is still in place), 
ethical concern is with the collective welfare of participants in the study, not with that of each 
participant taken individually. Pursuing the latter – such as by trying to allocate each participant in 
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terms of his or her specific clinical presentation rather than by a wholly random mechanism – is likely 
to run counter to the methodological demands of the study. This is not to deny that patients may 
benefit by participating in clinical trials [65], but it indicates that such benefits are not individuated. 
 
Trials based on OAR raise questions regarding the different prospects of benefit for early versus late 
enrollees, and regarding the way in which emerging information seems to determine how new recruits 
are handled, but not those already in the study. In addition, whilst clear empirical evidence may be 
lacking, it is reasonable to think that OAR presents considerable challenges in terms of disclosure on 
the part of the researcher and comprehension on the part of the investigator. Particular problems in 
this regard centre on the notions of therapeutic misconception and therapeutic misestimation. 
 
Some of the concerns that have been outlined in respect of OAR can be mitigated by design 
modifications. For example, the likelihood of weighting randomization to the ‘wrong’ treatment can 
be reduced by restricting the range of randomization probabilities or by employing an initial ‘burn-in’ 
of equal randomization [50, 66], and using baseline information through a more elaborate process of 
covariate-adaptive response-adaptive randomization might bring treatment allocation closer to the 
individual patient [67, 68].15 However, other ethical difficulties with OAR remain that are less 
amenable to reparative strategies at the level of design. 
 
Does fixed-ratio randomization fare better? 
The advocate of OAR – or at least one who subscribes to E1 – might argue that FRR fares no better. 
One criticism might be that, by taking no account of accumulating data on treatment effectiveness, 
other than at specific interim analyses, FRR simply ignores information relevant to participants’ 
welfare [7]. Worse, the objection might run, the FRR trialist is prepared to randomize 50% of 
participants to the seemingly inferior treatment in the face of such information, whereas OAR strives 
to randomize fewer. Thus, Palmer contends that ‘possible 9:1 randomization in adaptive designs… 
remains a better deal for participants than 1:1 randomization’ [47, p.393] and Pullman and Wang 
argue that, under FRR, the last patient enrolled in a trial has only a 50% chance of receiving the better 
treatment, whereas the first patient treated after completion of the trial has a much higher chance of 
doing so [18]. One response on behalf of FRR could be that no account is taken of accruing, as 
opposed to interim, evidence because it is insufficiently informative. Pocock states that the principal 
role of interim analyses is to ‘look for treatment differences which are sufficiently convincing and 
important to stop or change the trial’ [24, p.143]. On this basis, it might be argued that accruing data, 
                                                            
15 Some design modifications that aim to strengthen OAR trials have associated disadvantages. Greater 
efficiency in a multi-arm OAR trial may be gained by maintaining the size of the control group at that of the 
best-performing active treatment arm. However, this undercuts the ethical motivation of OAR by preventing 
preferential randomization to this arm in comparison to the control arm [10]. 
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assessed pari passu with participant allocation, do not constitute ‘convincing’ evidence and do not 
therefore substantiate any claim that participants have received, or failed to receive, the better 
treatment during the course of the trial; such evidence is only obtained through a formal statistical 
evaluation at a prespecified interim analysis.16 As a second rejoinder, advocates of interim analysis in 
the context of FRR might indicate that they respond more fully to a loss of equipoise, by halting the 
trial or perhaps dropping a treatment group, in contrast to the somewhat partial and inconsistent 
response in OAR.  
 
Berry [3] defends OAR against charges of inefficiency by indicating that, in some cases where there 
are both safety and efficacy objectives, a randomization ratio of 4:1 may be more efficient, in terms of 
the required number of participants, than a ratio of 1:1. However, this appears to be an argument 
favouring unequal over equal randomization in such circumstances rather than one favouring OAR 
over FRR. Advocates of FRR need not insist on 1:1 randomization; they would simply require that if 
imbalances in treatment arms brought about by OAR reduce efficiency, this should be justified by 
countervailing ethical considerations. 
 
With regard to consent, both OAR and FRR face challenges in terms of achieving appropriate 
disclosure and comprehension, particularly in relationship to randomization. However, even if these 
objectives are imperfectly met in FRR, they are probably better achieved than in OAR. A 
straightforward process of randomization is likely to be easier to explain and understand than one 
framed in terms of changing probabilities of allocation, and difficulties with the therapeutic 
misconception and/or therapeutic misestimation will likely be more acute in OAR.  
 
Overall, and depending in part on the construal of equipoise that underlies its use, the moral case for 
OAR in terms of welfare and autonomy is yet to be established. 
 
Figure legend: Ethical issues as they relate to the progress of a study using outcome-adaptive 
randomization. 
Funding: No funding was received for this study. 
Ethical approval: This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals 
performed by the author. 
 
                                                            
16 This counter-argument depends, however, on the appropriate number and timing of interim analyses. If such 
analyses are too few, or occur too infrequently, or adopt an unsuitable statistical threshold for termination of the 
trial [69, 70], there is a sense in which a trial based on FRR would indeed be open to the charge of taking 
inadequate account of relevant information. 
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